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Abstract: Prospective customers of financial and insurance products can be targeted based on the
profit the provider expects to earn from them. We present a model for individual expected profit and
two alternatives for calculating optimal personalized prices that maximize the expected profit. For one
of these alternatives, we obtain a closed-form expression for the price offered to each prospective
customer; for the other, we need to use a numerical approximation. In both approaches, the profits
generated by prospective customers are not immediately observed, given that the products sold by
these companies have a risk component. We assume that willingness to pay is heterogeneous and
apply our methodology using real data from a European insurance company. Our study indicates
that a substantial boost in profits can be expected when applying the simplest optimal pricing
method proposed.
Keywords: sales optimization; optimal price; price elasticity
1. Introduction
Financial service providers can maximize their expected profits by fine-tuning the price of their
products. Here, we address the problem that banks and insurance companies face as they seek to fix
a price that is high enough to cover potential risk yet low enough to attract customers. We present
and compare two optimization strategies: the first involves identifying the optimal personalized price
discount on a closed-form expression, which permits a straightforward implementation; the second is
based on a numerical optimization procedure.
Profit maximization is a challenge, dependent on a company’s specific knowledge of the
probability of a sale, the cost of a sale attempt, and the expected profit once a sale has been made.
Here, we propose extending this general approach by introducing price personalization. To do
so, we approximate each customer’s reaction to a price increase/decrease and from this derive an
expression for the optimal price at which a product should be sold to maximize the expected profit,
accounting at the same time for the possibility that the customer will not buy the product if the price is
too high. Customer reactions to changes in price, i.e., their price elasticity, are known to vary, and their
willingness to pay is not the same. We then compare this optimal pricing approach with a strategy that
requires no assumption about price elasticity but which is not a one-step formula.
We present a real case study conducted within the motor insurance sector. We made a purchase
offer (i.e., the price given to a prospective customer by a member of the sales staff for a specific product)
to a sample of potential motor insurance clients, some of whom were given a modified price so that we
could study their response. During data collection, the experiment was constructed in such a way that
a purchase offer was associated with a change in price, which neither the sales staff nor the prospective
customers were aware of. This means the price change can be considered as being independent of any
characteristics of the individual, and we can compare the purchase probability of individuals offered
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different prices and calculate the average price elasticity for this specific motor insurance product.
The data set also contains descriptive information about the prospective customers and the vehicles
to be insured. As usual, we divide the data into a training and a test sample. In the first sample,
we estimate the components of our expected profit formula, and then, in the test sample, we compare
the implementation of the two optimization strategies.
Even if we do not present the theoretical background of this paper, we need to mention the topic
of perfect competition and the role of prices in a competitive market. Companies apparently look
at things in the same way, but they still have different prices, and these pricing differentials do not
compete away. Not all companies operate with the same costs, so they have to charge customers for
that; moreover, there is imperfect information when assessing the level of risk to be covered because
some factors are difficult to measure. For example, in motor insurance, aggressiveness and driving
style are examples of such risk factors.
Our work only considers risk-related variables to set prices. We do not discuss here if some
jurisdictions could allow rates that depend on variables not related to loss costs. The protection of
social discrimination on the one hand and the right to profit maximization in a firm on the other are
a subject beyond our scope, but social discrimination questions and ethics are of outmost importance.
When we use the words “optimal” and “efficient”, we refer to values from the firm’s perspective, but as
we will see later, even including age as a potential profit maximization factor, could be controversial.
We only give an illustration of the methodology and we do not aim at imposing this particular choice
of variables influencing the price. In many US states where underwriting criteria must be mutually
exclusive and exhaustive, each insured must fit into exactly one rating cell, and they must all be
offered the same price. That would probably make the type of experiment described here impossible
(see NAIC’s white paper, (National Association of Insurance Commissioners NAIC)).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on optimal insurance
contracts. Section 3 describes our model and sets out its profit expressions. It also discusses optimal
pricing and profit maximization strategies. The interplay between theory and practice is explored
in Section 4, where the real-data study is presented. The value of pricing strategies is discussed in our
conclusions, and directions for future research are identified.
2. Literature Review
The financial services offered by banks and insurance companies (including mortgage contracts
and other types of loans; household, car, and motorcycle insurance policies; and other kinds of personal
insurance products) differ from conventional retail products and services. First, there is a time gap
between the collection of payment and the realization of the cost, which complicates profit calculation.
Selling different types of risk transfer products is a paradox from a standard manufacturing point of
view, because it is merely a promise to compensate if a particular event occurs. As such, the product
is sold before its final cost is known. Second, prices and internal processes are often supervised by
authorities to ensure that the providers stay solvent. Third, the costs associated with a risk transfer
product may vary greatly: many customers are likely to produce small or no costs for the company,
while a few might be associated with extremely high cost payouts.
The pricing of financial services has generated its own specific strand in the academic
literature, where extensive coverage has been given to risk assessment, solvency, fair premium
calculation (Goovaerts et al. 1984), the design of optimal insurance policies (Rothschild and
Stiglitz 1976; Dionne et al. 2000), and, to a lesser degree, insurance purchase and claim decisions
(Von Lanzenauer and Wright 1991). However, the identification of potential customers that might be
suited to a given type of insurance contract, including possible price reductions or increases, has only
been examined in relation to experience rating models (Boucher et al. 2009; Denuit et al. 2007) and
purchase probability (Guelman and Guillen 2014). Moreover, the interface between optimal pricing
and profit maximization remains largely unexplored.
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The insurance marketing literature has turned its attention to the identification of prospective
customers. For example, Bult and Wansbeek (1995) base optimal target selection on identifying
customers with positive marginal profit. This represents an initial step towards the efficient
segmentation of potential customers based on expected profits. However, rather than concentrating on
short-term profits, companies can estimate a customer’s lifetime value. Venkatesan and Kumar (2004)
define and explore customer lifetime value, employing a model that uses classical regression techniques.
Gönül and Hofstede (2006) take this approach further by introducing optimization objectives, such
as profit maximization, customer retention and utility maximization. Donnelly et al. (2013) study
asymmetric information as part of the pricing scheme. Other studies of customer segmentation address
the concept of cross-sellin, and include the notable contributions of (Kamakura et al. 1991, 2003,
2004; Knott et al. 2002; Li et al. 2005, 2010; Kamakura 2007). Cross-market strategies are analyzed
by Goié et al. (2011), who conclude that even a strategy of offering discounts redeemable in other
firms can produce some revenue by simultaneously increasing price and sales in the source market.
Schweidel et al. (2011) observe the same phenomenon in data from a multi-line insurance provider in
Denmark, which took into account historical information and anticipated lapses. Guillen et al. (2012)
find future profit prospects in a similar context to be very informative (see also Guillen et al. 2011;
Guelman et al. 2012). Kaishev et al. (2013) present a profit model specifically designed for products
for which the profit consists of a stochastic income at the point of sale, minus the cost of contacting
a specific customer and the stochastic cost generated by the customer’s actions. The model is primarily
intended for use in the insurance and banking sector, where customers can be associated with losses
(claims or loan defaults), thus affecting a company’s profit.
Our methodology differs from that employed by Guelman and Guillen (2014) because, rather than
focusing on the probability of renewal or purchase given a price offer, we explicitly derive an optimal
price for each customer, knowing that the price has an impact on the probability of renewal.
Recently, Laas et al. (2016) analyse developments in motor insurance pricing in Germany,
Austria and Switzerland. They focus on the use of different tariff criteria, on the tools used
for market-based and customer-specific pricing, and on the information considered for customer
valuation. Eling and Luhnen (2008) previously analysed the periods of market price competition in
the German motor insurance market after 1994.
3. Individual Profit as Influenced by Price Elasticity
Our model involves a financial services company that offers K different products. We also
consider a set of i = 1, ..., I individuals (prospective customers). The product of interest k could be
any risk transfer product, such as an insurance policy, mortgage or credit card. We are interested in
the profit (The profit is usually calculated for a one-year period, but this can be extended to a longer
period or even to the customer’s lifetime. We use the same notion for profit and its components as
in (Guelman and Guillen 2014)), Hik, generated by individual i for product k. This profit is unknown
when the product is offered to the client. We assume that the product has not yet been purchased.
There is a tariff price. i.e., the actuarial price, for individual i and product k, denoted as Π0ik, which is
based on information known to the company about the individual’s risk and the desired level of
coverage. This information is denoted as vector xik. Based on xik, we are able to calculate the tariff
price, which might differ significantly from one individual to another. We introduce a price change
parameter cik for individual i and product k. This parameter modifies the price, so the price offered
is Πik = (1+ cik)Π0ik. Note that cik = 0 gives the tariff price, cik > 0 corresponds to a price offered
above the tariff price and vice versa for cik < 0 (cik ≤ −1 is invalid because it would produce
a non-positive price).
3.1. The Individual Profit Model
When the company offers product k to individual i with a given price change cik, the individual’s
response (purchase/no purchase) is a Bernoulli random variable that depends on the observed
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characteristics xik. Then, its expected value is pik, i.e., the probability of selling product k to individual
i when the change in price is equal to cik. When there is no price change, cik = 0, then the probability
of selling equals p0ik. We assume that every sales attempt is associated with a deterministic and
constant cost ωk, indifferent to whether or not the contacted customer purchases the product. This cost
represents the costs of staffing and administrating the sales department. If the product is sold, then
the individual will be associated with a stochastic severity Sik, which is typical of financial service
products and can be either the cost of loan defaults or the cost of insurance claims, depending on the
type of financial business the company is involved in.
We use the concept of point price elasticity defined as
eik =
log
(
p0ik
pik
)
log(1+ cik)
ifcik 6= 0 and cik > −1. (1)
Expression (1) provides the value of price elasticity when data on an individual’s response to
a price change cik are available.
We assume that an individual’s response to a sales attempt is related to the price change and the
price elasticity involved, but not to the tariff price. We also assume that it is independent of the severity,
which can only be observed later in time. Drawing on the model developed by Kaishev et al. (2013),
here, we propose an extended version that takes the price elasticity eik into account. The expected
profit associated with individual i for product k is
µik = E[Hik] = pik((1+ cik)Π0ik − E(Sik))−ωk. (2)
The model developed by Kaishev et al. (2013) is a special case of (2), where cik = 0.
3.2. Model Estimation
Without loss of generality, we use insurance-specific terminology in what follows. To estimate the
expected profit for individual i and product k in Expression (2), we need to estimate all its components.
The tariff price Π0ik can be obtained using a standard pricing procedure (see Frees and Valdez 2008),
given the characteristics of the client and product, Xik. For variable Sik we follow the standard actuarial
convention and identify it as the aggregate claims cost
Sik =
Nik
∑
t=1
Zikt, (3)
where Nik describes the stochastic number of insurance claims (for individual i) and Zik describes
the corresponding monetary size of each of these claims. The expected number of claims and their
cost, i.e., E(Nik) = g−11 (xik) and E(Zik) = g
−1
2 (xik), where g1 and g2 are the link functions, can thus
be estimated from a standard number of claims and severity generalized linear models. Finally, we
obtain E(Sik) = E(Nik)E(Zik).
We consider two possible approaches to approximate sales probability pik. First, we assume that
all customers have the same elasticity ek. Under this approach, we estimate a logistic model for p0ik
(without using any information about price changes) and then find pik from (1). So, we denote by p
(1)
ik
the resulting probability of purchase.
p(1)ik =
p0ik
(1+ cik)
ek where p0ik =
exp(β0k +
J
∑
j=1
β jkxijk)
exp(β0k +
J
∑
j=1
β jkxijk) + 1
. (4)
In practice, the best way to estimate price elasticity ek is by conducting an experiment with
a sample of customers to see how much their purchase probability changes when price change
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cik modifies the original tariff price. We expect a price increase to reduce the probability of
purchase and a fall in price to increase this probability. However, this change in probability is not
necessarily symmetrical.
The second approach to estimate the purchasing probability, which we denote as p(2)ik , is to
incorporate the price change cik directly in the logistic model as follows:
p(2)ik =
exp(β0k +
J
∑
j=1
β jkxijk + β J+1kcik)
exp(β0k +
J
∑
j=1
β jkxijk + β J+1kcik) + 1
. (5)
In this second approach, we do not assume a constant elasticity, and implicitly we can derive eik
from (1) using p(2)ik in (5).
In both the logistic formulas above, xijk refers to the j-th characteristic of individual i and product
k, which influences the propensity to buy, and (β0k, β1k, . . . , β Jk, β J+1k) is the vector of parameters in
the logistic models, where J is the total number of characteristics in the model. We have intentionally
separated the parameter associated with cik from the other parameters.
3.3. Optimization of Expected Profit
We are interested in finding the value of the price change parameter cik specific for each individual,
at which the expected profit (2), from that individual, is maximized. Hence, the optimization problem
is maxcik E[Hik] and our two alternatives for pik presents us with two different solutions to this problem.
In the case of the first alternative, we are able to derive a closed-form expression for the optimal
cik, which we denote
c∗(1)ik = arg maxcik>−1
{p(1)ik ((1+ cik)Π0ik − E(Sik))−ωk}. (6)
We can present the following proposition, for which the proof is found in the Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Under the assumption that pik = p
(1)
ik , the price change c
∗(1)
ik which maximizes µik in (2) is
the following
c∗(1)ik =
E(Sik)ek
Π0ik(ek − 1) − 1. (7)
Note that the optimal price change is bound by c∗(1)ik ≥ p
1
ek
0ik − 1. Only in this case is the
corresponding probability p(1)ik less than or equal to 1.
A closed-form expression for the maximum expected profit can be obtained by inserting (7) into
(2) and, after some rearrangements, it yields
µik
(
c∗(1)ik
)
= p0ik
(
Π0ik
ek
)ek( ek − 1
E(Sik)
)ek−1
−ωk (8)
In the case of the second alternative, no closed-form expression can be found, and so we solve
this optimization problem numerically. The optimal price change for the second alternative can be
expressed as
c∗(2)ik = arg maxcik>−1
{p(2)ik ((1+ cik)Π0ik − E(Sik))−ωk} (9)
which corresponds to the maximization of (2) with the sales probability from the second alternative.
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4. Real Data Study
We have a large sample of car insurance offers made by a European insurance company during
2012. Only one purchase price is offered to a specific prospective customer for a specific product by
one of the sales personnel. The customer’s response to this offer can either be to accept it or reject it.
This response is reflected in the data set as a binary variable. The data also contain information about
the characteristics of each individual contacted (age, place of residence, driver’s license details, etc.)
and the car involved (make, fuel type, age, etc.), as well as the price offered, the tariff price, and the
estimated expected claims cost. The data set comprises 154,278 offers, of which 81,854 are associated
with a random price test, allowing us to estimate the price elasticity and all the parameters for profit
optimization. During the price test experiment, a specific price change was randomly assigned to
each price offer of either −5%, 0%, or +5% of the tariff price, thus enabling us to measure the effect of
a price change on purchase probability. To the other 72,424 offers, which are not associated with the
pricing experiment, we applied the two alternative models for optimal pricing in order to compare
their outcomes with respect to the expected total profit.
The random price test is designed in such a way that an individual receives a price change of
cik = −5%, cik = 0%, or cik = +5% with approximate probabilities 10%, 80%, and 10%, respectively.
The individual is not shown the value resulting from the price test or the tariff price pˆi0ik, only the
price pˆiik = (1+ cik)pˆi0ik, where pˆi0ik is an estimate of Π0ik.
For our first approach, from the results presented in Table 1, we estimate the average price
elasticity as a weighted average of (1) as
eˆk =
7898 · log(
0.0921
0.109 )
log(1− 0.05) + 8095 ·
log( 0.09210.0796 )
log(1+ 0.05)
7898+ 8095
= 3.14. (10)
Table 1. Summary of the results from the price test experiment.
Price Change Number of Offers Average Sales Probability
−5% 7898 10.90%
0% 65,861 9.21%
+5% 8095 7.96%
4.1. Parameter Estimation
Our procedure for obtaining parameter estimates is based on the 81,854 records in the data set
associated with a random price test. It involves two steps.
Step 1. Estimating the initial parameters ωk, E(Sik) and Π0ik.
We assume that the estimated cost of a sales approach ωk is generic for all customer contacts. We
obtain the estimate ωˆk = 11 by analyzing cost loadings and overheads, as well as by interviewing sales
managers at the company.
An estimated expected cost per customer, sˆik is available in the data set. In practice, many
insurance companies take the average cost per claim and multiply it by the expected number of
claims in a year, based on the characteristics of the vehicle to be insured and the individual’s
socio-demographic characteristics. sˆik is used to estimate E(Sik). Note that there is an issue the
issue when considering an individual’s assessment of their own risk versus the tariff rate. We do
not consider premium loadings here to account for any deviations due to the difficulties to measure
risk factors.
The tariff price, pˆi0ik, is available in the dataset and is used to estimate Π0ik.
Step 2. Estimating the sales probability p0ik and p
(2)
ik .
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We use the sample of data for the logistic model for both p0ik and p
(2)
ik , i.e., the 81,854 records
that are associated with the random price test. Note that the model for p0ik does not include the
price change cik as an explanatory factor even though it is significant; rather, the effect of the price
change is captured outside the logistic model (see (4)). A qualitative analysis reveals a mix of both
categorical and continuous explanatory factors that describe the behavior of the purchase response.
The percentage of price offers that led to a purchase is 9.25% of the data sample. The explanatory
factors used in this example are listed here:
• Price change: The price change cik is a continuous explanatory factor only present in the model
for p(2)ik .
• Tariff premium: The tariff premium pˆi0ik (in hundreds of euros) is a continuous explanatory factor
with minimum, mean and maximum equal to 1.001, 4.038, and 15.000, respectively.
• Age: Age of the person contacted as a categorical factor; ≤40, 41–60, and >60. Sample frequencies
are 27.6%, 53.8%, and 18.6%, respectively.
• House: Indicator variables describing whether or not the person owns their home (affirmative for
40.3% in the sample).
• Fuel: The type of fuel the car runs on; petrol or diesel. Sample frequencies are 81.7% and
18.3%, respectively.
In practice, insurers can probably extend this list to other characteristics like territory, occupation,
type of vehicle, and so on. The parameter estimates and their corresponding standard errors in
parentheses are presented in Table 2, for both model alternatives.
Table 2. Estimated logistic regression parameters for the two alternative sales probability models.
Standard error for the parameter estimates are in parentheses.
Factor p0ik p
(2)
ik
intercept −1.797 (0.055) −1.806 (0.056)
tariff premium −0.202 (0.008) −0.200 (0.008)
Age (41–60) −0.270 (0.028) −0.270 (0.028)
Age (61–) −0.328 (0.037) −0.327 (0.037)
House (Y) 0.0440 (0.025) 0.440 (0.025)
Fuel (petrol) 0.321 (0.038) 0.323 (0.038)
price change - −2.877 (0.551)
Akaike Informaton Criterion (AIC) is equal to 49.081 for p0ik and 49.056 for p
(2)
ik , sample size equals 81,854, and all
parameter estimates are significant with p-value < 0.001.
4.2. Profit Maximization and Calculation of Optimal Price Changes
We use the remaining 72,424 records from our data set for the purpose of applying the optimal
price changes and the corresponding expected profit from our two optimization alternatives. Our aim is
to determine which of the two optimal price change alternatives—(7) or (9)—generates the largest total
expected profit. Summary statistics from the price optimization using both alternatives are presented
in Table 3. We calculate the expected profit in three pricing scenarios, using (2). The baseline expected
profit µˆik(0) assumes that no price change has been applied to any individual, while the two alternatives
for optimal expected profit µˆik
(
cˆ∗(1)ik
)
and µˆik
(
cˆ∗(2)ik
)
assume that the optimal, and individual specific,
price changes cˆ∗(1)ik and cˆ
∗(2)
ik have been considered, respectively. Statistics for the sales probability,
for the three pricing scenarios, are also found in Table 3. For instance, under model 2, the maximum
optimal price change that is obtained in this sample equals 35.0%, while, for model 1, the maximum in
this sample is 46.7%. In this sample, model 2 leads to an average optimal price increase of around 5%,
while model 1 leads to an average optima price slight decrease of around 0.8%.
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Table 3. Summary statistics of the parameter estimates, optimal price changes and corresponding
expected profit. Min and max are the value (lowest and highest) of a single observation of the
corresponding magnitude in the first column.
Definition Parameter Min Mean Max
Sales cost ωˆk 11 11 11
Exp. claims cost sˆik 22 413 1.507
Tariff price pˆi0ik 110 454 1.646
Opt. price change cˆ∗(1)ik −0.547 −0.008 0.467
Opt. price change cˆ∗(2)ik −0.329 0.050 0.350
Sales probability pˆ0ik 0.0062 0.0874 0.225
Sales probability pˆ(1)ik 0.0026 0.107 1
Sales probability pˆ(2)ik 0.032 0.0788 0.321
Exp. Profit µˆik(0) −10.8 −0.229 16.1
Exp. Profit µˆik
(
cˆ∗(1)ik
)
−9.16 0.285 32.9
Exp. profit µˆik
(
cˆ∗(2)ik
)
−9.19 0.107 16.2
Total sample size is 72,424.
In Table 4, we focus solely on the offers associated with a positive expected profit and give
the number of these as well as the sum of the corresponding expected profit for the three pricing
scenarios. The closed-formula method based on (4) and (6) is presented in the middle column of
Table 4. It provides the best results in terms of the expected total profit (105,425 euros, which is
higher than the other two), the number of offers with a positive expected profit (35,692, which is also
higher than the other two), and the average expected profit per positive offer (105,425/35,692, which is
also higher than the other two). The poorest performance is recorded by the baseline alternative
(first column), where no price change is performed. The last column of Table 4 indicates that the
numerical optimization with a personalized price change based on (9) does not improve the results of
the direct method based on (6).
Table 4. Statistics for only the price offers associated with a positive expected profit, µˆik(0) > 0,
µˆik
(
cˆ∗(1)ik
)
> 0 and µˆik
(
cˆ∗(2)ik
)
> 0, respectively.
Description cik = 0 cik = cˆ
∗(1)
ik cik = cˆ
∗(2)
ik
Number of offers with µˆik > 0 31,383 35,692 33,807
Expected total profit (€) 84,181 105,425 92,448
Total sample size is 72,424.
In Figure 1, we present an example of the application of the two sales probability models pˆ(1)ik
and pˆ(2)ik for one specific individual offer in the data set and for different values of the price change cik.
For cik > 0 the two alternatives give almost identical sales probability values; however, for cik < 0,
the difference increases as cik decreases. Figure 1 presents an explanation as to why the first alternative
pik = p
(1)
ik is superior to pik = p
(2)
ik , with respect to expected total profit. In the case of negative price
changes, the first alternative results in higher sales probabilities than with the second alternative,
and hence it is associated with higher expected profits. Figure 1 shows only one example of the
two models applied to a specific individual offer; however, the general appearance is similar for all
cases in the data sample. Note, once more, that we have estimated the price elasticity ek from price test
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data between cik = −0.05 and cik = 0.05, hence the effect of any price changes on the sales probability
outside this interval has to be extrapolated.
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methods for making optimal price changes are relevant for financial sales practitioners d could lso
be pplied in the much br ader context of pricing in general.
We have found that the value of insurance customers i higher in the case of those who generate
larger expected profits; however, profits are i fl e c ri , price in turn is dependent
on willingness to pay. We hav estimated a constant, product-specific pric elasticity, based on
an experiment involving large sample of customers. We have then used this as ne of the inputs
in our profit optimization. W believe that an in-depth study of willingness to pay in relation to
motor insurance (which is compulsory) should be carried out. A price r ti s on a specific
optimization model is certainly useful.
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Although our experiment has focused on small price changes, the results obtained should be
applicable to a wider range of price changes. There is a caveat, however, in that the price changes in
our setup are not associated with any change in coverage. Aligning price change with risk coverage to
guarantee that an expected premium is sufficient to cover the risk involved is another possibility not
explored herein.
Our model does not reflect the fact that insurance profits cannot be gauged immediately, which is
why we only analyze expected profits, and why the observed customer lifetime value could distort the
final outcome of our modeling. Whether or not the retrospective evaluation of profits and solvency
issues would alter this paper’s findings is a subject for future research.
Besides the insurance sector there are a few areas where our method can be applied, for instance
when pricing financial products like a personal loan. In that case, a few basis points variation in
the interest rate charged to the credit applicant can have an enormous impact on the customer’s
decision to look for the loan in another institution and to the profitability. Today, many banks offer
instantaneous credit to certain customers, but the risk premium may not be the same to every customer.
The methods presented here may help a banking institution to carefully personalize the offer in
order to retain profitable customers. Moreover, since customers can easily compare access to credit
and conditions from other banks in the same way that prospective customers compare prices of
insurance policies, the problem of attracting profitable clients is linked to setting an optimal interest
rate. The generalizability of our methodology to other areas of financial services is straightforward
however the particular elasticities that we found for motor insurance do not need to hold in other
financial products, where customers may have other preferences and priorities.
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Appendix A
Proof. Proof of (7).
We can rewrite (3) as
µik = p0ikΠ0ik(1+ cik)
(1−ek) − p0ikE(Sik)(1+ cik)−ek −ωk.
Differentiating with respect to cik gives
dµik
dcik
= p0ikΠ0ik(1− ek)(1+ cik)−ek − p0ikE(Sik)(−ek)(1+ cik)−ek−1 =
= p0ik
(
Π0ik(1− ek)
(1+ cik)
ek +
E(Sik)ek
(1+ cik)
ek+1
)
and by equating to zero (noting that p0ik > 0) we obtain
Π0ik(1− ek)
(1+ cik)
ek +
E(Sik)ek
(1+ cik)
ek + 1
= 0.
The above can be rewritten as
(1+ cik)
−ek (Π0ik(1− ek)(1+ cik) + E(Sik)ek) = 0.
Noting that cik > −1 we obtain
Π0ik(1− ek)(1+ cik) + E(Sik)ek = 0
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which is solved by
cik =
E(Sik)ek
Π0ik(ek − 1) − 1.
Second-order condition leads to a maximum when Π0ik(1+ cik) = Πik < E(Sik)
(ek + 1)
(ek − 1) .
From (7), it should be noted that ek > 1 for the optimal price change c∗ik to lead to a positive
final price.
References
Boucher, Jean Philippe, Michel Denuit, and Montserrat Guillen. 2009. Number of accidents or number of claims?
An approach with zero-inflated Poisson models for panel data. Journal of Risk and Insurance 76: 821–46.
[CrossRef]
Bult, Jan Roelf, and Tom Wansbeek. 1995. Optimal selection for direct mail. Marketing Science 14: 378–94.
[CrossRef]
Denuit, Michel, Xavier Marechal, Sandra Pitrebois, and Jean-Francois Walhin. 2007. Actuarial Modelling of
Claim Counts: Risk Classification, Credibility and Bonus-Malus Systems. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
ISBN 978-0-470-02677-9.
Dionne, Georges, Neil Doherty, and Nathalie Fombaron. 2000. Adverse selection in insurance markets.
In Handbook of Insurance. Edited by Dionne, Georges. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, chp. 7;
pp. 185–244. [CrossRef]
Donnelly, Catherine, Martin Englund, Jens Perch Nielsen, and Carsten Tangaard. 2013. Asymmetric Information,
Self-Selection and Pricing of Insurance Contracts: The Simple No-Claims Case. The Journal of Risk and
Insurance 81: 757–80. [CrossRef]
Eling, Martin, and Michael Luhnen. 2008. Understanding price competition in the German motor insurance
market. Zeitschrift fur die Gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft 97 (S1): 37–50. [CrossRef]
Frees, Edward W., and Emiliano A. Valdez. 2008. Hierarchical insurance claims modeling. Journal of the American
Statistical Association 103: 1457–69. [CrossRef]
Goié, Marcel, Kinshuk Jerath, and Kannan Srinivasan. 2011. Cross-Market Discounts. Marketing Science 30: 134–48.
[CrossRef]
Gönül, Füsun, and Frenkel Ter Hofstede. 2006. How to Compute Optimal Catalog Mailing Decisions.
Marketing Science 25: 65–74. [CrossRef]
Goovaerts, Marc, Florent De Vyder, and Jean Haezendonck. 1984. Insurance Premiums: Theory and Applications.
Oxford: Elsevier Science Ltd., ISBN-13: 978-0444867728.
Guelman, Leo, and Montserrat Guillen. 2014. A causal inference approach to measure price elasticity in
Automobile Insurance. Expert Systems with Applications 41: 387–96. [CrossRef]
Guelman, Leo, Montserrat Guillen, and Ana M. Pérez-Marín. 2012. Random forests for uplift modeling:
An insurance customer retention case. In Modeling and Simulation in Engineering, Economics and Management.
Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 115; Edited by Engemann, K. J., A. M. Gil-Lafuente and
J. M. Merigó. Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 123–33. [CrossRef]
Guillen, Montserrat, Ana Maria Perez, and Manuela Alcañiz. 2011. A logistic regression approach to estimating
customer profit loss due to lapses in insurance. Insurance Markets and Companies: Analyses and Actuarial
Computations 2: 42–54. Available online: https://businessperspectives.org/journals/insurance-markets-and-
companies/issue-197/a-logistic-regression-approach-to-estimating-customer-profit-loss-due-to-lapses-
in-insurance (accessed on 8 February 2018). [CrossRef]
Guillen, Montserrat, Jens Perch Nielsen, Thomas Scheike, and Ana Maria Pérez-Marín. 2012. Time-varying effects
in the analysis of customer loyalty: A case study in insurance. Expert Systems with Applications 39: 3551–58.
[CrossRef]
Kaishev, Vladimir, Jens Perch Nielsen, and Fredrik Thuring. 2013. Optimal customer selection for cross-selling of
financial services products. Expert Systems with Applications 40: 1748–57. [CrossRef]
Kamakura, Wagner A. 2007. Cross-Selling: Offering the Right Product to the Right Customer at the
Right Time. In Profit Maximization through Customer Relationship Marketing. Edited by Aksoy, Lerzan,
Timothy L. Keiningham and David Bejou. Philadelphia: Haworth Press, pp. 41–58.
Risks 2018, 6, 0 12 of 12
Kamakura, Wagner A., Sridhar N. Ramaswami, and Rajendra K. Srivastava. 1991. Applying latent trait analysis in
the evaluation of prospects for cross-selling of financial services. International Journal of Research in Marketing
8: 329–49. [CrossRef]
Kamakura, Wagner A., Michel Wedel, Fernando de Rosa, and Jose Alfonso Mazzon. 2003. Cross-selling through
database marketing: A mixed data factor analyzer for data augmentation and prediction. International Journal
of Research in Marketing 20: 45–65. [CrossRef]
Kamakura, Wagner A., Bruce S. Kossar, and Michel Wedel. 2004. Identifying Innovators for the Cross-Selling of
New Products. Management Science 50: 1120–33. [CrossRef]
Knott, Aaron, Andrew Hayes, and Scott A. Neslin. 2002. Next-product-to-buy models for cross-selling applications.
Journal of Interactive Marketing 16: 59–75. [CrossRef]
Laas, Daniela, Hato Schmeiser, and Joël Wagner. 2016. Empirical Findings on Motor Insurance Pricing in Germany,
Austria and Switzerland. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice 41: 398–431. [CrossRef]
Li, Shido, Baohong Sun, and Ronald T. Wilcox. 2005. Cross-Selling Sequentially Ordered Products: An Application
to Consumer Banking Services. Journal of Marketing Research 42: 233–39. [CrossRef]
Li, Shibo, Baohong Sun, and Alan L. Montgomery. 2010. Cross-Selling the Right Product to the Right Customer at
the Right Time. Journal of Marketing Research 48: 683–700. [CrossRef]
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). 2015. Price Optimization White Paper.
Available online: http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_catf_related_price_optimization_white_
paper.pdf (accessed on 26 January 2018).
Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph Stiglitz. 1976. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the
Economics of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 630–49. [CrossRef]
Schweidel, David A., Eric T. Bradlow, and Peter S. Fader. 2011. Portfolio Dynamics for Customers of a Multiservice
Provider. Management Science 57: 471–86. [CrossRef]
Venkatesan, Rajkumar, and Vita Kumar. 2004. A Customer Lifetime Value Framework for Customer Selection and
Resource Allocation Strategy. Journal of Marketing 68: 106–25. [CrossRef]
Von Lanzenauer, Christoph Haehling, and Don D. Wright. 1991. Operational research and insurance.
European Journal of Operational Research 52: 129–41. [CrossRef]
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
